Abstract: This paper tries to explain why and how category theory is useful in computing science, by giving guidelines for applying seven basic categorical concepts: category, functor, natural transformation, limit, adjoint, colimit and comma category. Some examples, intuition, and references are given for each concept, but completeness is not attempted. Some additional categorical concepts and some suggestions for further research are also mentioned. The paper concludes with some philosophical discussion.
Categories
The rst dogma is as follows:
To e ach species of mathematical structure, there c orresponds a category whose objects have that structure, and whose morphisms preserve it.
It is part of this guideline that in order to understand a structure, it is necessary to understand the morphisms that preserve it. Indeed, category theorists have argued that morphisms are more important than objects, because they reveal what the structure really is. Moreover, the category concept can bede ned using only morphisms. Perhaps the bias of modern Western languages and cultures towards objects rather than relationships accounts for this see 50, 64 for some related discussion. By way of notation, we use ;" for composition, and 1 A for the identity morphism at an object A. Now some examples:
1.1 Sets. If we take sets to beobjects, then their morphisms are clearly going to befunctions. A set morphism, however, is not just a set of ordered pairs, because it must also specify particular source and target sets. This is consistent with practice in computation theory which assigns types to functions. The set theoretic representation of functions is an artifact of the set theoretic foundations of mathematics, and like all such representations, has accidental properties beyond those of the concept it is intended to capture. One of those properties is that any two sets of ordered pairs can becomposed to yield a third. The category Set of sets embodies a contrary point of view, that each function has a domain in which its arguments are meaningful, a codomain in which its results are meaningful, and composition of functions is only allowed when meaningful in this sense. See 36 for related discussions.
1.2 Relations. Just as with functions, it seems desirable to take the view that the composition of relations is only meaningful when the domains match. Thus, we m a y de ne a relation from a set A 0 to a set A 1 to be a triple A 0 ; R ; A 1 with R A 0 A 1 , and then allow its composition with B 0 ; S ; B 1 to be de ned i A 1 = B 0 . This gives rise to a category that we denote Rel, of which Set can be considered a subcategory. 1.3 Graphs. A graph G consists of a set E of edges, a set N of nodes, and two functions @ 0 ; @ 1 : E ! N which give the source and target of each edge, respectively. Because the major components of graphs are sets, the major components of their morphisms should be corresponding functions that To show that we h a ve a category Graph of graphs, we m ust show that a composition of two such morphisms is another, and that a pair of identity functions satis es the diagrams and also serves as an identity for composition. Because the major components of automata are sets, the major components of their morphisms should be corresponding functions that preserve the structure. where fg denotes an arbitrary one point set with point . It must be shown that a composition of two such morphisms is another, and that a triple of identities satis es the diagrams and serves as an identity for composition. These checks show that we have a category Aut of automata, and their simplicity increases our con dence in the correctness of the de nitions 18 .
1.6 Types. Types are used to classify things," and according to the rst dogma, they should form a category having types as objects; of course, depending on what is being classi ed, di erent categories will arise. A simple example is nite product types, which are conveniently represented by natural numbers, with morphisms that describe what might be called register transfer operations" among tuples of registers". Thus, n 2 ! indicates an n-tuple ht 1 ; :::; t n i of data items in n registers," and a morphism f : m ! n is a function f1; :::; ng ! f 1; :::; mg indicating that the content of register fi should be transferred to register i, for i = 1 ; :::; n. In fact, if we identify the numbern with the set f1; :::; ng and 0 with ;, then this category is the opposite of a subcategory of Set; let us denote it N. A variant of N has as its objects the nite subsets of a xed countable set X, and as morphisms again the opposites of functions among these, so that we get another opposite of a subcategory of Set, denoted say X. Here, the registers" are denoted by variable symbols" from X, rather than by natural numbers. Going a little further, we can assign sorts from a set S to the symbols in X, and require that the morphisms preserve these sorts. Let us denote this category X S .
1.7 Substitutions. Two key attributes of a substitution are the set of variables into which it substitutes, and the set of variables that occur in what it substitutes. Thus, substitutions have natural source and target objects, each a set of variables, as in Example 1.6 above. Clearly there are identity substitutions for each set of variables substituting each variable for itself, and the composition of substitutions is associative when de ned. Thus, we get a category with substitutions as morphisms.
1.8 Theories. In his 1963 thesis 49 , F.W. Lawvere developed a very elegant approach to universal algebra, in which a n algebraic theory is de ned to be a category T whose morphisms correspond to equivalence classes of terms, and whose objects indicate the variables involved in these terms, as in Example 1.6 above. In this approach, theories are closed under nite products as de ned in Example 4.1 below. Although Lawvere's original development w as unsorted, it easily extends to the many-sorted case, and in many other ways, including the so-called sketches" studied by Ehresmann, Gray, Barr, Wells, and others; for example, see 3 . Of course, all the theories of a given kind form a category.
Isomorphism
One very simple, but still signi cant, fruit of category theory is a general de nition of isomorphism, suitable for any species of structure at all: a morphism f : A ! B is an isomorphism in a category C i there is another morphism g : B ! A in C such that g;f = 1 A and f; g = 1 B . In this case, the objects A and B are isomorphic.
It is a well established principle in abstract algebra, and now in other elds as well, that isomorphic objects are abstractly the same, or more precisely:
Two objects have the same structure i they are isomorphic, and an abstract object" is an isomorphism class of objects.
This demi-dogma can be seen as a corollary of the rst dogma. It provides an immediate check on whether or not some structure has been correctly formalised: unless it is satis ed, the objects, or the morphisms, or both, are wrong. This principle is so pervasive that isomorphic objects are often considered the same, and the X" is used instead of an X" when X is actually only de ned up to isomorphism. In computing science, this principle guided the successful search for the right de nition of abstract data type" in 33 .
Diagram Chasing
A useful way to get an overview of a problem, theorem, or proof, is to draw one or more diagrams that show the main objects and morphisms involved. A diagram commutes i whenever p and p 0 are paths with the same source and target, then the compositions of the morphisms along these two paths are equal. The fact that pasting two commutative diagrams together along a common edge yields another commutative diagram provides a basis for a purely diagrammatic style of reasoning about equality of compositions. Because it is valid for diagrams in any category whatever, this proof style is very widely applicable; for example, it applies to substitutions as in Example 1.5. Moreover, it has been extended with conventions for pushouts, for uniqueness of morphisms, and for certain other common situations.
Often proofs are suggested just by drawing diagrams for what is known and what is to be proved. A simple illustration from Example 1.3 is to prove that a composition of two graph morphisms is another graph morphism; all we h a ve to do is paste together the corresponding diagrams for the two morphisms.
Functors
The second dogma says:
To any natural construction on structures of one species, yielding structures of another species, there corresponds a functor from the category of the rst species to the category of the second.
It is part of this dogma that a construction is not merely a function from objects of one species to objects of another species, but must also preserve the essential relationships among objects, including their structure preserving morphisms, and compositions and identities for these morphisms. This provides a test for whether or not the construction has been properly formalised. Of course, functoriality d o e s not guarantee correct formulation, but it can be surprisingly helpful in practice. Now some examples: 2.3 Models. In the Lawvere approach to universal algebra 49 , an algebra is a functor from a theory T to Set. Here, construction" takes the meaning of interpretation": the abstract structure in T is interpreted i.e., constructed concretely in Set, i.e., these functors must preserve nite products. More generally, i f T is some kind of theory, then models" of T are functors M : T ! S et that preserve the structure of these theories, e.g., nite products. More generally, w e can take models of T in a suitable category C with nite products, as nite product preserving functors. For example, many sorted algebras arise as functors from a theory over the type system X S ; Example 1.5 can be seen as an example of this, by taking S to have three elements.
2.4 Forget It. If all widgets are whatsits, then there is a forgetful functor" from the category of widgets to the category of whatsits. For example, every group is a monoid by forgetting its inverse operation, and every monoid is a semigroup by forgetting its identity. Notice that a ring with identity is a monoid in two di erent ways, one for its additive structure and one for its multiplicative structure. to the partial identity function ! ! ! de ned i X 2, and the assignment X := X , 1" corresponds to the partial function ! ! ! sending X to X , 1 when X 0. The semantics of P with input node n and output node n 0 is then given by the formula Pn; n 0 = S fPp j p : n ! n 0 2 P aGg.
This approach originated in Burstall 5 3 Naturality
The third dogma says:
To each natural translation from a construction F : A ! B to a construction G : A ! B there corresponds a natural transformation F G.
Although this looks like a mere de nition of the phrase natural translation," it can nevertheless bevery useful in practice. It is also interesting that this concept was the historical origin of category theory, since Eilenberg and Mac Lane 11 used it to formalise the notion of an equivalence of homology theories, and then found that for this de nition to make sense, they had to de ne functors, and for functors to make sense, they had to de ne categories. This history also explains why homology theory so often appears in categorical texts, and hence why so many of them are ill-suited for computing scientists. Now some examples: 3.1 Homomorphisms. As already indicated, in the Lawvere approach to universal algebra, algebras are functors, and so we should expect homomorphisms to be natural transformations; and indeed, they are. 
Limits
The fourth dogma says:
A diagram D in a category C can be seen as a system of constraints, and then a limit of D represents all possible solutions of the system.
In particular, if the diagram represents some physical or conceptual system, then the limit provides an object which together with its projection morphisms represents all possible behaviours of the system that are consistent with the given constraints. This intuition goes back to some work on General System Theory from 1969-74, 16, 27 , and has many applications in computing science:
4.1 Products. An early achievement of category theory was to give a precise de nition for the notion of product," which was previously known in many special cases, but only understood vaguely as a general concept. The de nition is due to Mac Lane 46 . T assumed to have nite products is a nite product preserving functor that is surjective on objects, from T to a category A with nite products. Except for degenerate" cases, a theory T : T ! A is bijective on objects, and we can assume that jT j = jAj and that T is a subcategory of A; hence, we may identify T and A. A morphism of theories over T is a nite product preserving functor which also preserves T . An algebra of a theory T : T ! A is a nite product preserving functor to Set or more generally, to a category C with nite products. Of course, homomorphisms of T-algebras are natural transformations, giving a category of T-algebras. When T = N, we get the classical unsorted general algebras, in Lawvere form. When T = X, with X S-sorted, we get S-sorted general algebras. 22 also discusses congruences and quotients of generalised Lawvere theories. exists. For the classical case of unsorted, anarchic i.e., obeying no laws theories, the morphisms are terms, and equalisers give most general uni ers. More general kinds of uni cation arise by going to more general kinds of theories; for example, imposing associative and commutative laws on some operations in the theory leads to so-called AC-uni cation. For some theories, only weak equalisers can be found; these weaken the there exists a unique morphism" requirement to mere existence. In fact, weak equalisers formalise the classical de nition of uni ers; nonetheless, the stronger condition is often satis ed in practice. Generalising again, a system of constraints is a diagram in a theory, and its most general solution is given by its limit, if it exists.
There are many examples of this situation: solving systems of linear equations; polymorphic type inference; uni cation in the sense of uni cation grammars" in linguistics; solving Scott domain equations; and least xpoints. All these examples and some others are discussed in more detail in 22 , as are some techniques for proving that uni ers exist. Another example is the justication of the formula in Example 2.7 for the semantics of a program.
Adjoints
The fth dogma says:
To any canonical construction from one species of structure to another corresponds an adjunction between the corresponding categories.
Although this can beseen as just a de nition of canonical construction," it can bevery useful in practice. The essence of an adjoint i s t h e universal property that is satis ed by its value objects. This property says that there is a unique morphism satisfying certain conditions. It is worth noting that any t wo right, or left adjoints to a given functor are naturally equivalent, i.e., adjointness determines a construction uniquely up to isomorphism. Now some examples:
5.1 Products and Sums. Many of the constructions described above are intuitively canonical, and hence are adjoints. For example, binary products in a category C give a functor : CC!C, which is left adjoint t o : C ! C C , the diagonal" functor, sending an object C in C to the pair C;C, and sending a morphism c : C ! C 0 in C to c; c : C;C ! C 0 ; C 0 i n C C . Moreover, C has coproducts also called sums" i has a right adjoint. This beautifully simple way to formalise two mathematical concepts of basic importance is due to Mac Lane 46 , and extends to general limits and colimits. 5.4 Syntax and Semantics. One of the more spectacular adjoints is that between syntax and semantics for algebraic theories, again due to Lawvere in his thesis; see 49 .
Cartesian Closed Categories. A Cartesian closed category has binary
products, and a right adjoint to each functor sending A to AB. It is remarkable that this concept turns out to be essentially the typed -calculus; see 45 . This connection has been used, for example, as a basis for the efcient compilation of higher order functional languages 8 . An advantage is that optimisation techniques can be proved correct by using purely equational reasoning.
Kleisli Categories. Another way to generalise Lawvere theories is to view
an arbitrary adjunction as a kind of theory. So-called monads also called triples are an abstraction of the necessary structure, and the Kleisli category over a monad gives the category of free algebras 47 . Again, there are surprisingly many examples. The paper 22 shows how a Kleisli category generates a generalised Lawvere theory, and then shows that many di erent problems of uni cation that is, of solving systems of equations can be naturally formulated as nding equalisers in Kleisli categories. Examples include uni cation in order sorted and continuous theories. Moggi 55 uses Kleisli categories to get an abstract notion of computation" which gives rise to many interesting generalisations of the -calculus.
Colimits
The sixth dogma says:
Given a species of structure, say widgets, then the result of interconnecting a system of widgets to form a super-widget corresponds to taking the colimit of the diagram of widgets in which the morphisms show how they are interconnected.
At least for me, this intuition arose in the context of General Systems Theory 16, 27 . It may beinteresting to note that the duality between the categorical de nitions of limits and colimits suggests a similar duality between the intuitive notions of solution and interconnection. Now some examples:
6.1 Putting Theories together to make Speci cations. Complexity is a fundamental problem in programming methodology: large programs, and their large speci cations, are very di cult to produce, to understand, to get right, and to modify. A basic strategy for defeating complexity is to break large systems into smaller pieces that can be understood separately, and that when put back together give the original system. If successful, this in e ect takes the logarithm" of the complexity. In the semantics of Clear 6, 7 , specications are represented by theories, in essentially the same sense as Lawvere but many-sorted, and with signatures, and speci cations are put together by colimits in the category of such theories. More speci cally, the application of a generic theory to an actual is computed by a pushout. OBJ 13, 28, 14 , Eqlog 30 , and FOOPS 31 extend this notion of generic module to functional, logic i.e., relational, and object oriented programming, and in their combinations. It has even been applied to Ada 21, 63 .
6.2 Graph Rewriting. Another important problem in computing science is to nd models of computation that are suitable for massively parallel machines. A successful model should be abstract enough to avoid the implementation details of particular machines, and yet concrete enough to serve a s a n i n termediate target language for compilers. Graph rewriting provides one promising area within which to search for such models 43, 32, 15, 41 , and colimits seem to be quite useful here 10, 58, 44 . Graph rewriting is also important for the uni cation grammars that are now popular in linguistics 60, 22 . There seem to be many opportunities for further research in these areas.
6.3 Initiality. The simplest possible diagram is the empty diagram. Its colimit is an initial object, which is more simply explained as an object that has a unique morphism to any object. Like any adjoint, it is determined uniquely up to isomorphism, so any t wo initial objects in a category are isomorphic of course, this can also be shown directly; hence, initiality gives a convenient w ay to de ne entities abstractly". It is also worth mentioning that universality can be reduced to initiality in a comma category, and hence so can colimits. of a least xpoint.
Comma Categories
The seventh dogma says:
Given a species of structure C, then a species of structure obtained by decorating" or enriching" that of C corresponds to a comma category under C or under a functor from C.
It seems more di cult to be precise about this intuition than the others, but hopefully some examples will help to clarify things. The following are just a few of the many examples that can be found in computing science:
7.1 Graphs. Many categories of graph are comma categories. For example, if 2 denotes the functor Set ! S et sending S to S S, then the category Graph of Example 1.3 is the comma category Set 2. 7.2 Labelled Graphs. Given some category G of graphs and a forgetful functor U : G ! Set, say giving the node set of graphs in G, and given a set L to beused for node labels, then the comma category U L is the category of graphs from G with nodes labelled by L. In the same way, we can decorate edges of graphs, or branches of trees.
7.3 Theories. If F P C at is the category of categories with nite products, with nite product preserving functors as morphisms, and if T is a type system i.e., an object in FPCat, then the category of theories over T is T F PCat.
Comma categories are another basic construction that rst appeared in Lawvere's thesis. They tend to arise when morphisms are used as objects. Viewing a category as a comma category also makes available some general results to prove the existence of limits and colimits 25 .
Further Topics
Although they are particularly fundamental, the seven dogmas given above far from exhaust the richness of category theory. This section mentions some further categorical constructions, about each of which one might express surprise at how many examples there are in computing science.
8.1 2-Categories. Sometimes morphisms not only have their usual composition, identity, source and target, but also serve as objects for some other, higherlevel, morphisms. This leads to 2-categories, of which the category Cat of categories is the canonical example, with natural transformations as morphisms of its morphisms. This concept was mentioned in Example 2.7, and is also used in 24 , 26 , 40 , 56 , among other places, and is mentioned in 61 .
8.2 Monoidal Categories. There are many cases where a category has a natural notion of multiplication that is not the usual Cartesian product but nevertheless enjoys many of the same properties. The category of Petri nets studied in 52 has already been mentioned, and a variety of recent w ork suggests that monoidal categories may be broadly useful in understanding the relationships among the various theories of concurrency, e.g., see 12 .
8.3 Indexed Categories. A strict indexed category is just a functor B op ! C at.
The papers 62 and 23 give many examples of indexed categories in computing science, and 62 gives some general theorems, including simple su cient conditions for completeness of the associated Grothendieck" category. Moggi 56 applies indexed categories to programming languages, and in particular shows how to get a kind of higher order module facility for languages like ML. Non-strict indexed categories are signi cantly more complex, and have been used in foundational studies 57 . 8.5 Topoi. A profound generalisation of the idea that a theory is a category appears in the topos notion developed by Lawvere, Tierney, and others. In a sense, this notion captures the essence of set theory. It also has surprising relationships to algebraic geometry, computing science, and intuitionistic logic 3 6 , 2 , 4 2 .
Discussion
The traditional view of foundations requires giving a system of axioms, preferably rst order, that assert the existence of certain primitive objects with certain properties, and of certain primitive constructions on objects, such that all objects of interest can be constructed, and all their relevant properties derived, within the system. The axioms should be as self-evident, as few in number, and as simple, as possible, in order to nurture belief in their consistency, and to make them as easy to use as possible. This approach is inspired by the classical Greek account of plane geometry.
The best known foundation for mathematics is set theory, which has been very successful at constructing the objects of greatest interest in mathematics. It has, however, failed to provide a commonly agreed upon set of simple, self-evident axioms. For example, classical formulations of set theory such as Zermello-Frankel have been under vigorous attack by intuitionists for nearly eighty years. More recently, there has been debate about whether the Generalised Continuum Hypothesis is true," following the originally startling proof by P aul Cohen that it is independent of other, more widely accepted axioms of set theory. Still more recently, there has been debate about the Axiom of Foundation, which asserts that there is no in nite sequence of sets S 1 ; S 2 ; S 3 ; ::: such that each S i+1 is an element of S i . In fact, Aczel 1 and others have used an Anti-Foundation Axiom, which positively asserts the existence of such non-well founded sets, to model various phenomena in computation, including communicating processes in the sense of Milner 54 . I think it is fair to say that most mathematicians no longer believe in the heroic ideal of a single generally accepted foundation for mathematics, and that many no longer believe in the possibility of nding unshakable certainties" 4 upon which to found all of mathematics.
Set theoretic foundations have also failed to provide fully satisfying accounts of mathematical practice in certain areas, including category theory itself, and moreover have encouraged research i n to areas that have little or nothing to do with mathematical practice, such as large cardinals. Mac Lane 48 gives a lively discussion of these issues; see also 37 for an overview of various approaches to foundations. In any case, attempts to nd a minimal set of least debatable concepts upon which to erect mathematics have little direct relevance to computing science. Of course, the issue no longer seems as urgent a s it once did, because no new paradoxes have been discovered for a long time.
This paper has tried to show that category theory provides a number of broadly useful, and yet surprisingly speci c, guidelines for organising, generalising, and discovering analogies among and within various branches of mathematics and its applications. I wish to suggest that the existence of such guidelines can beseen to support an alternative, more pragmatic view:
Foundations should provide general concepts and tools that reveal the structures and interrelations of various areas of mathematics and its applications, and that help in doing and using mathematics. In a eld which is not yet very well developed, such as computing science, where it often seems that getting the de nitions right is the hardest task, foundations in this sense can bevery useful, because they can suggest which research directions may befruitful, using relatively explicit measures of elegance and coherence. The successful use of category theory for such purposes suggests that it provides at least the beginnings of such a foundation.
